The Legacy of Atatürk in the 21st Century Turkey

Introduction: The Dual Nature of Kemalism

The legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, represents a unique phenomenon in the political history of the 20th century. The six fundamental principles of Kemalism — republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism (secularism), and revolutionaryism — formed the ideological matrix of the Turkish state. However, in the early 21st century, this legacy is subject to a massive revision, making its prospects critically important for understanding the future, not only of Turkey but of the entire region.

Historical Context and the Essence of Reforms

Atatürk implemented an unprecedented comprehensive set of modernization reforms aimed at transforming the Ottoman heritage into a national state of the European model. Key transformations included:

Political-legal: Abolition of the sultanate (1922) and the caliphate (1924), adoption of the Civil Code (1926) modeled after Switzerland.

Socio-cultural: Introduction of the Latin alphabet (1928), granting women the right to vote (1934), which outpaced many European countries, ban on religious symbolism in public spheres.

Ideological: Construction of a new national identity based on the Turkish ethnic component and the pre-Islamic history of Anatolia (the "Solar Language" and "Turkish History" theories).

Interesting fact: The language reform led to a unique generational gap: by the 1930s, youth could not read texts published a decade earlier. This was a conscious act of "accelerated break" with the Ottoman past.

Systemic Challenges to Kemalism in the Modern Era

Demographic and social shifts. Urbanization and the growth of an educated religious middle class, especially in deep Anatolia, have created a mass demand for a review of the rigid secularism. This new social layer perceived Kemalist secularism not as neutrality but as state control over religion and discrimination against practicing Muslims. The symbol of this confrontation became the long-standing struggle over the right to wear the hijab in universities and government institutions, which ended with its legalization under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The Kurdish question. The ethnic nationalism of Kemalism, which denied the independent existence of Kurds and pursued a policy of assimilation ("mountain Turks"), has encountered the growth of the Kurdish national movement. This has forced the Turkish state to seek new, more flexible models of national identity that allow for cultural diversity, which directly contradicts the original strict interpretation of the "nationalism" principle.

Geopolitical reorientation. A shift from the doctrine of "Peace in the country, peace in the world" and a passive defensive position to a neo-Ottoman active foreign policy, especially under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, changes Turkey's role. The ambitions of a regional leader and an independent player require a new ideological foundation, different from the west-oriented Kemalism.

Institutional crisis. The cornerstone of the Kemalist system was the autonomy of elite institutions — the army, the judicial system, and universities — which considered themselves guarantors of the secular character of the republic. Constitutional reforms in the 2010s, especially after the 2016 coup attempt, drastically changed the balance of power, placing these institutions under tight control of the executive authority.

The Future of the Legacy: Adaptation or Rejection?

The prospects of Atatürk's legacy lie not in a binary choice between preservation and rejection, but in a process of its deep transformation and adaptation.

The principle of secularism evolves from a strict "assertive" model (excluding religion from the public sphere) to a more "passive" (the state as a neutral arbiter between confessions). However, a complete abandonment of secularism as such is impossible due to its deep root in a significant part of society, especially among urban educated elites and in the security forces.

Nationalism is gradually reinterpreted. There is a growing demand for a more inclusive, civic identity that could integrate Kurds and other minorities while maintaining the dominant role of the Turkish nation. Paradoxically, but the rhetoric of Turkish greatness used by the current leadership itself has inherited many features of Kemalist nationalism, filling them with new, neo-Ottoman symbolism.

The institutional heritage (unitary state, republican form of government) remains immutable. Even the most radical critics of Atatürk do not propose to restore the caliphate or the sultanate. The basic elements of the statehood created by him are perceived as a given.

Important example: Even in the field of religious education, the influence of Kemalism is evident. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), created by Atatürk to control Islam, has not only not been abolished but has been transformed into a powerful state instrument for propagating "correct," loyal to the state Islam.

Conclusion: The Legacy as a Battleground

The legacy of Atatürk has ceased to be a sacred, frozen dogma and has become a field of sharp political and cultural struggle. Its prospects depend on the outcome of several fundamental processes:

The ability of Turkish society to develop a new social contract, balancing between secular and conservative-religious values.

The success of resolving the Kurdish question within the framework of a single state.

Turkey's geopolitical choice between transatlantic orientation and an independent role.

Economic stability, which is the foundation for any ideological constructions.

Atatürkism, as a project of modernization "from above," has generally fulfilled its historical task of creating a national state. Today, Turkey is seeking a new model that, while negating or criticizing certain aspects of Atatürk's legacy, is still forced to rely on the institutional and mental reality created by him. Thus, the most likely scenario is further pragmatic hybridization — a combination of a strong national state with a more conservative social model and an independent foreign policy, where Kemalist principles will not be discarded but reinterpreted in the context of new challenges of the 21st century.
© library.tz

Permanent link to this publication: